



FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ALLIANCE
BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TOBACCO CONTROL

BULLETIN

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TODAY

13.30–14.30

Lunchtime briefing on tobacco control in South Africa: education, economics and legislation

FCTC Secretariat lunchtime briefing on packaging and labelling

DEATH CLOCK

SINCE THE OPENING OF THE FIRST WORKING GROUP FOR THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, ON 25 OCTOBER 1999

40,220,273

PEOPLE HAVE DIED FROM TOBACCO-RELATED DISEASES. (AS OF 9AM ON 19 NOVEMBER 2008).

TIME TO TAKE REPORTING SERIOUSLY

Now is a critical time in the life of the FCTC. We are working hard to develop the instruments that will help all Parties to effectively implement the provisions of the Convention. The mechanisms being put in place will support effective implementation well into the future.

While much of this week's attention is focused on the guidelines being discussed in Committee A, the work of Committee B is just as critical to the FCTC's success.

Yesterday afternoon in Committee B, discussions began on reporting. Effective reporting arrangements are at the core of successful treaties. They enable the treaty's COP to perform its function of overseeing implementation and allow Parties to build on one another's achievements, learn from challenges encountered, and work together to overcome such challenges.

This week, Parties must consider both the detail and the bigger picture of FCTC reporting.

Decisions must be taken on the revised Group 1 questionnaire and the draft Group 2 questionnaire presented for the COP's consideration. Getting the questions right, and ensuring that the necessary guidance is provided in their accompanying instructions, is essential to ensuring that the reporting process performs its functions.

The need to give detailed attention to

the draft Group 2 questions was underlined by a number of Parties yesterday afternoon in Committee B, and this process will begin this morning in an informal working group. Beyond this week, further revisions will be needed before the Group 2 questions can be used by the first Parties that will report on these questions – in February 2010. The Group 2 questions (and the accompanying instructions for both questionnaires) will have to reflect the guidance provided by the COP in its decisions on the draft guidelines being considered for adoption this week. This need was highlighted by Canada in Committee A's discussions on the draft guidelines on Article 11 yesterday afternoon, and will apply to each of the guidelines under discussion.

Looking at the bigger picture, Committee B's attention was drawn to the need for Parties to take a decision this week on the review of the reporting arrangements expected to take place next year. As part of these discussions, broader questions such as the need for a dedicated subsidiary body to assist in achieving the objectives of reporting – as raised by India yesterday afternoon – must be considered. FCA strongly supports the establishment of such a body, which will demonstrate the genuineness of the COP's commitment to effective implementation of the FCTC.

FENÊTRE OUVERTE SUR LA CORRUPTION DE L'INDUSTRIE DU TABAC

Les délégués à la COP3 qui doivent débattre du projet de lignes directrices de l'article 5.3 de la CCLAT pourront trouver éclairant un article à paraître dans la revue juridique de la Caroline du Nord *Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation*. Sur la base de documents de l'industrie jusqu'alors inédits, cet article détaille les plans de responsables de l'industrie du tabac visant à verser des liquidités et d'autres avantages à l'un des responsables politiques japonais les plus influents et l'un des plus proches confidents du Premier Ministre de l'époque Yasuhiro Nakasone. L'objectif était de contrôler l'influence du Premier Ministre à l'égard des responsables de la Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (SALT), l'ex Japan Tobacco.

Au début des années, les efforts de la multinationale du tabac American Tobacco pour pénétrer le marché lucratif du tabac au Japon étaient mises à mal par des restrictions gouvernementales à l'importation. Toutefois, au cours d'une visite à Tokyo au début de l'année 1983, les responsables de Brown & Williamson (BWT) ont pris contact avec un parlementaire de longue date, Eiichi Nakao, « l'un des soutiens clés du Premier Ministre Nakasone Yasuhiro et l'un des parlementaires les plus influents du groupe agriculture. Nakao, au départ gratuitement, puis de manière rémunérée, avait pour mission d'exercer une influence politique afin de permettre à la compagnie de traiter avec JTS.

La nature cachée de l'engagement de Nakao était claire dès le départ : « Il va sans dire que l'image publique d'indépendance de Nakao à l'égard des intérêts commerciaux doit absolument être maintenue et préservée à tout prix ». Au même moment, une énorme somme d'argent fut versée à un ami de Nakao qui « devait percevoir environ la moitié des royalties sur la marque Kent accordée en licence à JTS » mais « Mr Y sera notre contact avec N afin d'isoler N de tous les aspects commerciaux de l'accord ».

D'après les plans, un accord fut finalisé au mois d'août 1983, lors d'une réunion à l'Hôtel Regency de New York à laquelle assistaient le Président de Brown & Williamson I.W. Hughes, Nakao et Yokohama. Les notes prises, frappées du sceau : « PRIVE ET CONFIDENTIEL » - QUESTION SENSIBLE révèlent les détails : Nakao et Yokoyama collaboreront discrètement afin de permettre à BWT d'améliorer sa part de marché globale avec ... JTS ». Cet accord est basé « sur une subvention (62500\$) allouée à l'entreprise de Y : une partie de ces fonds est versée à N pour ses manœuvres auprès du premier Ministre et les membres clés haut-placés du Parlement ; le reste étant utilisé par Y pour noyauter les responsables de JTS. » Pour cela, « N exercera son influence sur le premier Ministre afin de faire pression sur JTS au travers

notre stratégie marketing. »

Le 16 août 2003, quelques jours avant la rencontre, un consultant de Brown & Williamson ajouta un angle d'attaque, à savoir, obtenir l'aide de l'entreprise du fils de Nakao travaillant aux Etats-Unis. A nouveau, la discrétion fut d'une importance capitale. Le consultant rapporta : « je devrais être probablement le seul à prendre en charge le projet, puisque le nom de BWT ne devait pas y être mêlé, afin de protéger N. »

Un mémo manuscrit indique : « Très important », « pas de relations directes entre compagnies » et « N serait vraiment redevable. [sic] »

Aucun rapport écrit n'a pu être trouvé pour clarifier ce qui est ressorti de la réunion de New York. Plus tard, les documents suggèrent que Hugues et Nakao ont établi des relations de travail suivies, de différentes natures, mais les preuves sur papier sont extrêmement limitées.

Pour finir, les responsables et les agents de Brown & Williamson, incluant le Président de l'entreprise lui-même, réputé pour nager dans les eaux troubles des pots de vin et de la corruption des joueurs japonais.

Par ailleurs, comme l'explique l'article juridique, les faits suggèrent des violations criminelles de la Loi américaine pour les activités étrangères de corruption (US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).

En bref, le manque d'éthique et apparemment, l'activité illégale révélés, cette histoire démontre que les lignes directrices de l'Article 5.3 doivent être précisées afin que les compagnies de tabac publiques, appartenant à l'Industrie du tabac, puissent être traitées de la même manière que n'importe quel groupe indépendant de l'industrie du tabac, et que ces lignes directrices fassent obstacle aux conflits d'intérêts entre les représentants officiels et leurs employés, et les perspectives de gains offertes par l'industrie du tabac.

Le manque de documentation sur les versements clandestins souligne la nécessité de la mise à disposition d'une information transparente sur tous les aspects de l'ingérence politique de l'industrie du tabac.

Mark Levin & Mary Assunta

NO SE DEJEN MANIPULAR POR LA INDUSTRIA. ¡ACTÚEN YA!

Sin duda algunos de ustedes habrán recibido visitas, comunicados o cartas provenientes de la industria tabacalera con propuestas en relación a esta tercera Conferencia de las Partes que se está negociando esta semana.

Esto no lo mencionamos como crítica, sino como una observación dado que algunas cartas enviadas por Philip Morris, BAT y otras compañías han sido expuestas y han caído en nuestras manos.

En los comunicados de la industria tabacalera dirigidos a Ustedes, delegados, declaran que las medidas incluidas en las directrices para la implementación de los artículos 11 (empaquetado y etiquetado), 13 (publicidad promoción y patrocinio) y el 5.3 (protección de las políticas de salud pública contra los intereses comerciales de la industria tabacalera) del CMCT no son medidas diseñadas para proteger a la salud pública sino como medidas obstruccionistas hacia la industria tabacalera.

Por favor, delegados, no se dejen engañar y manipular por estos

argumentos de la industria tabacalera. El CMCT que ustedes, delegados representantes de países han negociado desde el 2000 está basado sobre la evidencia científica y su objetivo es de reducir la morbilidad y mortalidad causada por el consumo de los productos del tabaco, sin embargo el único objetivo de la industria tabacalera es de aumentar sus ingresos y enriquecer a sus accionistas, no de proteger a la salud pública.

Las directrices para los artículos 11 y 13 son consideradas no solo por los países facilitadores, sino por un gran número de delegaciones aquí presentes y la FCA, como guías determinantes para una implementación eficaz del CMCT. Ambas directrices preliminares siguen los altos estándares ejemplificados en la directriz del artículo 8. Estas ofrecen claras guías para que los Países adopten con las mejores prácticas la implementación de sus obligaciones.

Les invitamos a que se unan ya a un gran número de países dispuestos a adoptar de inmediato y sin modificaciones las guías para los

artículos 11 y 13.

La directriz que ha sido desarrollada para el Artículo 5.3 está por debajo de los estándares acordados en la COP 2. El artículo 5.3 es un elemento crítico, de alta significancia para toda la Convención. La COP 3 debe revisar detenidamente la directriz y adoptar aquellos lineamientos claros que ellos necesitan para resistir la influencia e interferencia de la Industria Tabacalera en el Control del Tabaco.

La FCA también invita a los países Partes para que provean el financiamiento suficiente que permita a la COP y al Secretariado desarrollar todo el trabajo que necesita en este período crítico para la implementación del CMCT.

El mundo entero nos está observando esta semana, y tiene la expectativa de que la COP 3 dé vida a directrices eficaces que puedan frenar los 5.4 millones de muertes anuales.

Gobiernos, no se dejen manipular por la industria. ¡Actúen ya! ¡Apoyen directrices fuertes y eficaces! ¡Financien la COP!

POR UN PANAMA LIBRE DE HUMO DE TABACO

Panamá trabaja en el control de la exposición al humo de tabaco desde los años 70's, intensificando sus esfuerzos a partir del 2000, con la negociación de Convenio Marco de la OMS para el Control del Tabaco (CMCT).

Luego de muchos intentos legislativos y contando con evidencias científicas obtenidas a partir de estudios realizados con el Instituto Mundial del Tabaco de la Universidad John Hopkins, donde se encontraron niveles moderados de cotinina en ambiente laborales cerrados, tales como bares y restaurantes, y reconociendo el impacto de ser Estado Parte en el CMCT, se logra por decisión unánime en la Asamblea Nacional de Diputados la aprobación de la Ley 13 de enero de 2008, que ubica a Panamá en el grupo de países que han logrado consolidar ambientes cerrados libres de humo de tabaco y además, incluir una prohibición total del consumo de tabaco en los ambientes públicos y privados, abiertos y cerrados, destinados a actividades deportivas.

En este camino se suman la participación de los jóvenes panameños, los esfuerzos de la sociedad civil nacional con el apoyo de la internacional y las campañas consistentes de concienciación a los tomadores de decisión y a la población que fueran realizadas con el concurso de los medios de comunicación a través de programas de opinión y de la prensa escrita.

Esta política permite al Estado panameño, asumir su compromiso de asegurar la protección de las personas contra la exposición al humo de tabaco de segunda mano y avanzar

en el proceso de desocialización del consumo de tabaco, con lo que se espera una disminución de la frecuencia de consumo de los productos de tabaco, como del inicio del mismo en la juventud.

La respuesta de la sociedad panameña ha sido excelente y se ha visto reflejada en las mediciones ambientales realizadas en conjunto con el Roswell Park Cancer Institute durante el primer mes de implementación de los espacios 100% libres de humo de tabaco, en los resultados de las inspecciones realizadas a locales objeto de esta ley y con las denuncias ciudadanas efectuadas ante el Ministerio de Salud como mecanismo de apoyo a la vigilancia del cumplimiento esta importante norma de salud pública.

Un mensaje final, nos lleva a recordar que la salud pública del Mundo aspira a que todos y cada uno de nosotros contribuyamos a la implementación y vigilancia de normas reconocidas como efectivas para proteger la salud de las personas de los daños que ocasionan los productos de tabaco y que el ideal no es que la gente fume menos, sino que definitivamente deje de fumar.



Reina Roa. MD. MSP

TOBACCO INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE TOBACCO CONTROL

The tobacco industry is a master of creating highly complex business structures to maximise the opacity of its operations, notably those aimed at defeating advertising bans. This is particularly true in the area of trade mark diversification (TMD), where the industry has demonstrated enormous creativity in eliminating evidence of business links between the company selling the related cigarette brand, such as Marlboro, and the derived product, Marlboro Classic clothing. The diagram below provides a remarkable illustration of the TDM scheme devised by BAT for its "555 Insights" brand. It is taken from an internal document dating back to the mid-1990s entitled "555 Insights – Up-Date", marked "SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL" (Bates No. 800064725/4736)

The non-tobacco business of BAT is conducted via a company called World Investment Company Ltd. (WIC), described in the document as: "WIC is a company under BAT Holdings which is in charge of managing trademarks outside its main core business, i.e. tobacco. **WIC and the trademarks under its responsibility do not have any link with tobacco.**" (emphasis added).

Apart from the initial legal and funding link between BAT and WIC, all links between the tobacco and non-tobacco businesses are shown as "informal" (dotted lines).

Notably, this applies to the link between BAT tobacco entities and creative and media agencies which advertise both types of products.

The document is quite explicit on the whole set-up: "Contact with local third parties - Local BAT are expected to help the TMD project to fruition. They will locally have connections and contacts that are invaluable [sic!]. Though the only party entitled and allowed by contract to speak on behalf of "555 Insights" is GTE. Local BAT should remain generic (no mention of the brand "555 Insights") on their local

researches for opportunities. **This to avoid to have any written correspondence/presentation/proposal from third parties to local BAT offices using the 555 Insights brand name.** *Third parties contact continuity* - Once the third party was introduced informally to GTE by local BAT, Local BAT should not have any further official contact with the third party involved on the 555 Insights project. **Of course privileged personal contact should continue.**" (emphasis added)

Although the BAT example dates back to the mid-90s, there are similar more recent examples. In 2006, Imperial Tobacco acquired the worldwide rights to the Davidoff cigarette brand for Euro 540 million. In a press release announcing the deal, the company stated that the "provisions of the acquisition enable us to maintain our excellent relationship with the Davidoff Oettinger Group, owner of the worldwide trademark for tobacco products other than cigarettes. This will ensure that both parties continue to share their expertise in managing the integrity of this valuable brand."


But Imperial remains highly secretive about the exact nature of these "provisions" with the Swiss group. Nor do they mention any link with the other Swiss companies that have rights over

the Davidoff brand for non-tobacco products (e.g. Zino Davidoff SA), although agreement with them must also be essential for managing the "integrity of this valuable brand".

A further example is the agreement between Philip Morris and Ferrari for the branding of Formula 1 racing cars including use of the Marlboro red and distinctive graphic elements such as white stripes. The only firm information is that the agreement was extended until 2012 despite F1 events supposedly now being free of tobacco advertising in most countries around the world.

These examples exemplify the need for transparency about tobacco industry operations, notably in respect of product promotion schemes and efforts to defeat advertising bans, in particular, via trade mark diversification. By requiring "rules for the disclosure or registration of tobacco business entities, affiliated organizations and individuals acting on their behalf", the draft guidelines on Article 5.3 could ensure transparency in place of the current smokescreens behind which the tobacco industry hides its marketing operations. Such transparency is essential for effective tobacco control.

Pascal Deithelm



This chart is (at least the left side) secret & confidential and should not be put on paper and copied.

MANIPULATING AFRICA

Once-secret tobacco industry documents illustrate a tobacco industry throughout Africa that is more brazen than anywhere else. But it is more a difference of degree than tactics. All of the world can learn from experiences brought sharply into focus in Africa.

Very frank, very informative tobacco industry documents abound here. Typical industry caution - at least with regard to creating a paper record of their questionable activities - often vanishes when dealing with Africa.

In particular, British-American Tobacco (BAT) seems to swagger about, like an omnipotent demi-god, believing that it is effectively unconstrained by any African government. And therein lies the challenge for all at this Conference, as Africa is far from alone.

THE BUSINESS OF MANIPULATION

Read through the industry's own documents and you see that manipulating governments is job Number One for the upper echelons of tobacco companies the world over. Usually, however, they are reluctant to boast about it on paper. Not so with Africa.

In a briefing to his chairman, Martin Broughton, in preparation for a 1994 meeting with then Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, BAT's territorial director for Africa advised:

"The Kenyan Government has passed a 'tobacco law.'... The law was actually drafted by us but the Government is to be congratulated on its wise actions."

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Industry conduct like this is neither isolated nor only minor in nature. Experience in Africa simply shows the industry at its most egregious. Take, for example, smuggling abetted by tobacco manufacturers.

SMUGGLING AS A LITMUS TEST

In materials written for public viewing, BAT steadfastly denied that it encouraged or colluded with others to smuggle. Contradicting this, however, are

many hundreds of internal company documents that they thought would never see the light of day.

A recently published report, based on BAT's own documents, alleges that BAT was complicit in cigarette smuggling in over 40 African countries (see map below). But there is no reason to think that the extent of smuggling in Africa is greater than elsewhere. More likely it is a bias in the available information caused by the industry being less vigilant in Africa than elsewhere in hiding documents.


It is not only that BAT appears to have been aiding smuggling just about everywhere, what they were doing

promote those legal cigarettes, but in reality filled much of the market with contraband that the industry euphemistically termed GT. They called this ruse a "cover operation."

What we see in Africa, however, are BAT documents that appear to implicate very senior executives, including then BAT Industries chairman Sir Patrick Sheehy. A plan for Benson & Hedges states:

"BATUKE wish to appoint a domestic importer enabling us to provide cover for advertising and GT business, [and] Sir Patrick felt that it was perfectly acceptable for BAT Cameroon to recommend a domestic importer for BHS."

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While this sort of activity was going on, BAT naturally wanted to keep its complicity hidden. Speaking about one of its prime smuggling middlemen in west Africa, Sorepex, the company says:

"One of the main functions of SOREPEX was to allow BAT to keep at arm's length from transit customers — particularly in Cameroon."

301626935

Finally, documents suggest that BAT also attempted to put physical distance between the middlemen and its in-house employees. This helped to keep documents related to this activity beyond the prying eyes of those who might sue BAT and obtain documentary discovery.

In the 1970s, a man named Emil Schildt worked on transit sales in west Africa out of a BAT office in Germany. The company later moved his operation off-site:

"One of the main reasons for establishing [Emil Schildt's] office independent from a B.A.T. company was that due to the delicate [nature of the] business the customers could visit the Hamburg office without involving a B.A.T. Company directly."

301073718

Eric LeGresley
Tobacco Control Consultant

highlights the enormity of the challenge for Conference participants. For if cigarette manufacturers are this devious in smuggling, one must assume similar nefarious activity in other areas addressed by the FCTC.

The African smuggling study suggests that BAT's business plans for their sales - legal or not - were predicated on maintaining viable smuggling channels. Moreover, industry's own documents suggest that smuggling plans were sometimes approved at the top.

In Asia, Latin America and elsewhere, BAT documents suggest that the company imports a small amount of legal cigarettes, advertised ostensibly to

SEX AND THE CITY

The activities of the tobacco industry in Canada highlight the importance of a strong Article 13, particularly in regard to plain packaging of tobacco products.

Canada has been a world leader in tobacco control, being the first country to mandate graphic package warnings occupying 50 per cent of both major faces (in 2000). Although Canadian warnings are in keeping with best practices as defined in the draft Article 11 guidelines, tobacco companies have recently redesigned the packaging of most brands and have succeeded in undermining the visibility and effectiveness of the pictorial warning messages.

The pack of XS Slims shown below is a case in point. The pack is exactly the size and shape of a Blackberry, a highly coveted 'badge' product among today's youth. Moreover, the pack features the words "Luxury Cigarettes," clearly lifestyle promotion that was banned under the federal Tobacco Act in 1995. When the pack is turned upside down, the embossed logo "XS" screams the word "SeX" in the same colouring as the logo of the international blockbuster series Sex and the City.



The new Benson & Hedges Superslims provides 20 cigarettes in a pack that is not much larger than the 'kiddy packs' of five and 10 cigarettes that Canada banned in 1994. The pack is in a box that is a trendy shade of lime green and is the size and shape of a box containing a small bottle of perfume or a cosmetic product, discreet enough to fit in even the smallest handbag! Most disturbing of all is that the warning text is almost illegible and the warning graphic largely obscured by the header, despite the fact that the warning meets the legal requirement that it occupy 50 per cent of both major faces.

Canada has also banned the use of the misleading descriptors 'light' and 'mild' on packs, but the industry has introduced package reforms that thwart the intent of this measure. Tobacco companies have replaced the terms 'light' and 'mild' with terms such as 'smooth', with colour schemes, and with numbering systems. New research by the University of Waterloo demonstrates that

the public believes that the new terms, the lighter colours, and the lower numbers signify brands with lower levels of tar and nicotine and reduced health risks.

In addition to undermining the impact of the health warnings and the prohibition on light and mild, tobacco companies are exploiting every means available to them - pack size, shape, opening style, material, colouring, logos, fonts, and descriptive phrases - to once again render the package a key vehicle by which to promote their brands. As a Citi Investment Research analyst concluded when assessing the potential impact of plain packaging on Imperial Tobacco Group PLC, "the pack is the brand."

In 1979, almost three decades ago, tobacco companies foresaw the day when tobacco promotion would be restricted to such an extent that it would all come down to the pack:

"Under conditions of total ban, pack designs ... have enormous importance.... Therefore the most effective symbols, designs, colour schemes, graphics and other brand identifiers should be carefully researched.... An objective should be to enable packs, by themselves, to convey the total product message."

The purpose of FCTC guidelines is to provide Parties with recommendations on best-practice implementation of obligations. Parties must take the broadest possible interpretation of "a comprehensive ban on advertising and promotion" and include the recommendation of plain packaging to prevent tobacco companies from merely transferring their marketing prowess from a magazine page or a billboard to the tobacco package itself.

Melodie Tilson
Non-Smokers' Rights Association
Canada



WEAK NEW CHINESE HEALTH WARNINGS NOW ON PACKAGES

Yesterday in Committee A there was a broad consensus in favour of adopting the Article 11 guidelines without change. AFRO, AMRO, EMRO, SEARO and the EU all expressed this position, as did many individual Parties. This is consistent with the FCA recommendation which calls for the Art. 11 guidelines to be approved as is.

Unfortunately, China was not at all part of this broad consensus. Last month, the Chinese government implemented its new package health warnings, warnings that are incredibly weak compared to what should be done in the interests of public health.

The new Chinese warnings contrast poorly with the 50 per cent picture-based warnings required by Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is part of China.

Well-designed warning labels are an effective method of informing a country's population about the harmful nature of tobacco products. Experience shows that warning labels will have greater potential impact if they:

- are large
- are more prominently displayed (on both the package front and back, and at the top of the front/back rather than at the bottom)
- contain information about *specific* health effects



- have a range of rotated warnings appearing concurrently

How do the Chinese pack warnings stand up? Two examples are shown here. Although the warnings do appear on both front and back, on one side the warnings inexplicably appear in English, a language familiar only to a tiny minority of China's population. Warnings appear at the bottom of the pack rather than at the top. They are 30 per cent and text-only, rather than 50 per cent with pictures. The font size of the text is small, especially considering the available space.

Moreover, the warnings are not required to be set apart from the package design,

so they lack the salience and prominence of warnings used by other countries that clearly indicate a separation between the pack design and the warning. The Chinese warnings also fail to have the rotation seen in many other countries.

Furthermore, there is a general message ("Smoking is harmful to your health") but no mention of specific diseases or conditions caused by smoking, such as cancer, strokes, heart attacks, impotence or impacts from second-hand smoke.

Warning labels constitute a central component of any comprehensive approach to tobacco control. After all, someone smoking 20 cigarettes a day is potentially exposed to the warnings 7,300 times every year. Given China's population and high smoking rate, the new weak warnings are a dramatic missed opportunity for public health.

We respectfully urge China to join the broad consensus in support of adopting the Article 11 guidelines without change.

Paul Graham



DIRTY ASHTRAY AWARD



To China for attempting to make a mockery of Article 11 guidelines including preferring beautiful cigarette packages over the health of its citizens.

ORCHID AWARD



To New Zealand for walking the walk as well as talking the talk on financial and technical assistance to help low-income countries implement the FCTC.

SRI LANKA WANTS TOTAL FREEDOM FROM SECOND-HAND SMOKE

A banner asserting the right of children to a smoke-free environment is on permanent display in the office of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

A similar banner, proclaiming the right of workers to smoke-free workplaces, is on view at the Labour Secretariat, while a third, declaring "Everyone has the right to breathe cleaner air", will soon find its way into the Ministry of the Environment.

These are elements in a public awareness campaign launched by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister in September. The campaign has been planned in accordance with guidelines approved by COP-2 on implementing Article 8 of the FCTC.

The ultimate objective of the public awareness campaign is to pass legislation to give full effect to the smoke-free provisions of Article 8.

The campaign is spearheaded by the Sri Lanka National Federation on Smoking and Health and the Alcohol and Drug Information Centre, both members of FCA.

Its three main messages – on the rights of children, workers and the general public to enjoy smoke-free conditions – are graphically illustrated on posters.

The message to children targets parents who smoke but are unaware of the damage they are causing to their children's health. A recent study conducted in Australia indicated that 11.3 per cent of children have become asthmatic because of their parents smoking. The message to parents is, "Allow your child to grow in a smoke-free environment".

Promoting the right of workers to work in smoke-free environments should be of particular benefit to women employed in

hotels, restaurants and other enclosed areas such as workers' canteens. As recently as 11 November, the banner reminding the workers of their right was unveiled in the main foyer of the Labour Secretariat by the Minister of Labour Relations and Manpower Development.

The campaign poster will be displayed in offices of the Department of Labour throughout the country.



A postcard campaign will supplement the banners and the display of posters in public offices, schools, bus stations and railway stations. Personally addressed cards will be sent to religious leaders, parliamentarians, community leaders and other prominent figures reminding them of their responsibility to ensure legislation is passed that secures a 100 per cent smoke-free environment. The aim is to make the FCTC guidelines on Article 8 effective by end 2009.

Olcott Gunasekera
President
Sri Lanka National Federation on Smoking and Health



The Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) is a global alliance of NGOs working to achieve the strongest possible Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Views expressed in the Alliance Bulletin are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of the sponsors.

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